Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019

Towards a Decentralized Process for Scientific Publication and Peer Review
using Blockchain and IPFS
Antonio Tenorio-Fornés
Viktor Jacynycz
David Llop
Antonio A. Sánchez-Ruiz
Samer Hassan
GRASIA, Universidad GRASIA, Universidad GRASIA, Universidad
GAIA, Universidad
GRASIA, Universidad
Complutense de Madrid Complutense de Madrid Complutense de Madrid Complutense de Madrid Complutense de Madrid
antoniotenorio@ucm.es vsjacynycz@ucm.es
dallop@ucm.es
antsanch@ucm.es
Berkman Klein Center
at Harvard University
shassan@cyber.harvard.edu

Abstract
The current processes of scientific publication and
peer review raise concerns around fairness, quality,
performance, cost, and accuracy. The Open Access
movement has been unable to fulfill all its promises, and
a few middlemen publishers can still impose policies
and concentrate profits. This paper, using emerging
distributed technologies such as Blockchain and IPFS,
proposes a decentralized publication system for open
science. The proposed system would provide (1) a
distributed reviewer reputation system, (2) an Open
Access by-design infrastructure, and (3) transparent
governance processes. A survey is used to evaluate
the problems, proposed solutions and possible adoption
resistances, while a working prototype serves as a
proof-of-concept. Additionally, the paper discusses
the implementation, in a distributed context, of
different privacy settings for both open peer review
and reputation systems, introducing a novel approach
supporting both anonymous and accountable reviews.
The paper concludes reviewing the open challenges of
this ambitious proposal.

1.

Introduction

Science publication and peer review are based on a
paper-based paradigm that has not seen large changes
in the last centuries [1]. Critics to current science
publication and peer review systems include concerns
about fairness [2], quality [3], performance [4], cost [5],
and accuracy of the evaluation processes [6].
The development of the Internet enabled an
expansion of the proposals for alternatives for both
science dissemination [7] and evaluation [8]. The
reduction of distribution costs enabled wider access
to scientific knowledge, and questioned the role of
traditional publishers [9].
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It is acknowledged that the Open Access and
Open Science movements have successfully reduced the
economic cost of readers to access knowledge [10].
However it has not successfully challenged traditional
publishers’ business models [11] that are often charging
both readers and authors [12].
Traditional peer review has suffered multiple
criticisms, and yet only few alternatives have gathered
success [13]. The literature provides multiple proposals
around open peer review [14], and proposals of
reputation networks for reviewers [15]. In fact, a
start-up, Publons1 , provides a platform to acknowledge
reviews and open them up.
In addition, other alternatives to the traditional
science publication process have arisen in the last 20
years. Preprints are scientific papers that have not been
peer-reviewed, therefore have not been published in a
journal or conference. Platforms such as arXiv2 and
Preprints.org3 have been successful within the scientific
community, allowing these pre-published papers to gain
more visibility [16].
Social networks have also carved a niche in the
community. Platforms such as Academia4 or Research
Gate5 are being used by more people every day, allowing
researchers to upload their published papers, further
connecting the scientific community.
Nevertheless, the mentioned platforms are
centralized, with an infrastructure typically controlled
by a sole private entity. This centralization has multiple
implications [17, 18], for example, less control and
self-management for the scientific community; a
requirement of blind trust in a third-party that can
change its terms or policies at anytime (e.g. in case
of a buy-in); or problems related to for-profit business
1 https://publons.com/
2 https://arxiv.org/
3 https://www.preprints.org/
4 https://www.academia.edu/
5 http://researchgate.com/
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models which may affect users, or their data.
Decentralized
alternatives,
despite
their
promises [19], are still in their infancy. A few proposals,
none of them functional to date, have appeared recently:
a peer review proposal using cryptocurrencies [20],
a blockchain-enabled app with voting and storage of
publications, again using cryptocurrencies [21], or a
peer review quality control through blockchain-based
cohort trainings [22]. Additionally, the new Ledger6
journal records the publication timestamps in the
Bitcoin blockchain.
This paper proposes the development of a
decentralized publication system for open science.
It aims to challenge the technical infrastructure that
supports the middleman role of the oligopoly of
traditional publishers [11]. Due to the successes of the
Open Access movement, some scientific knowledge is
freely provided by publishers. However, the content is
still mostly served from their infrastructure (i.e. servers,
web platforms). This ownership of the infrastructure
gives them power over the scientific community
which produces the contents [23]. Such a central and
oligopolistic position in science dissemination allows
them to impose policies (e.g. copyright ownership,
Open Access prices, embargo periods, dissemination
restrictions) and concentrate profits.
The proposed system presents the ambitious aim to
move the infrastructure control from the publishers to
the scientific community. It entails the decentralization
of three essential functions of science dissemination:
1) the selection and recognition of peer reviewers,
proposing a peer reviewer reputation system where
review reports can be rated 2) the distribution
of scientific knowledge, through the distribution of
scientific papers using the IPFS P2P network, providing
an Open Access by-design infrastructure, and 3) peer
review process communication, relying on Blockchain
to provide a transparent and decentralized platform
for open peer review process communications, such
as paper submissions, reviewer proposals or review
submissions. It specifically targets four issues of the
peer review process: 1) the quality, and 2) fairness
of peer review from authors’ perspectives, 3) the
fairness of recognition, reputation or rewards received
for reviewing from reviewers’ perspectives, and 4)
the difficulty in finding good reviewers from editors’
perspectives. Additionally, it proposes a decentralized
solution aiming to reduce the control of publishers
through their centralized infrastructure.
First, Section 2 offers a review of the state
of decentralization technologies and introduces the
concepts and technologies used in the paper. Then,
6 https://ledgerjournal.org

Section 3 provides an overview of the system’s
requirements, with a design explained in Section 4
and an implemented prototype described in Section 5.
In order to perform a preliminary evaluation of the
detected problems and proposed solutions, we have
performed a survey described in Section 6, including a
discussion of its results. In addition, since the proposed
open system raises multiple concerns around privacy,
Section 7.1 discusses the opportunities and challenges
around different privacy settings regarding peer review
in an open and decentralized network. Furthermore,
this section introduces a novel approach which enables
both anonymous and accountable reviews, bringing
together the promises of both blinded [24] and open
review [14] models, addressing the concerns about the
negative consequences for reviewers of a reputation
system. Finally, Section 8 discusses the benefits,
challenges, opportunities and open questions arising
from the described proposal.

2.

Decentralization Technology

As further explored in Section 3, this paper proposes
to use decentralized technologies to provide 1) a
reputation system for reviewers, 2) an Open Access
by-design infrastructure for paper distribution and 3)
transparency for peer review governance. This section
introduces the decentralization technologies on which
the paper proposals to rely. Note the section follows the
approach of Tenorio-Fornés et al. [25] which proposes
a framework for distributed systems in which IPFS is
used for distributing content and Blockchain to provide
consistent behavior.
IPFS: IPFS is a decentralized file system which
enables the distribution of content in a decentralized
network of peers (such as some P2P sharing systems
[26]). It also supports secure links among such contents
(Merkle-links [27]), enabling the use of complex data
structures such as those used in git [28] or blockchain.
This paper proposes the use of IPFS to distribute
the papers and reviews of the system (see Section
3.2). Thus, papers and reviews can be unambiguously
identified in the network by the hash of their data.
Blockchain: Blockchain was the first technology
that enabled a fully distributed digital currency,
Bitcoin [29]. It solved the double-spending problem by
which a dishonest actor may try to spend the same coin
twice in decentralized currency systems. It relies on a
ledger of transactions that is updated and maintained
by a network of peers. The blockchain introduces
incentives to maintain the security of the ledger, both
rewarding nodes that contribute computational power
for the security of the network, and requiring at least
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half of the computing power of the network to alter the
state of the blockchain — i.e. the blockchain is secure
if at least half of the computing power is provided by
honest peers. This technology enabled a new wave of
decentralization of applications such as domain name
registries [30] or microblogging platforms7 . A second
wave of blockchain-based decentralization was started
by Ethereum [31], as described below.
Ethereum and smart contracts: Ethereum is a
blockchain-based distributed computing platform.
It started the aforementioned second wave of
decentralization [31], which enabled the deployment,
on the blockchain, of small code snippets named
smart contracts [32]. In this technology, the peers
of the network execute the code of smart contracts.
Similarly to Bitcoin, where a network of peers ensure
the validity of a ledger of transactions, in Ethereum a
network of peers ensures the execution of these smart
contracts. Thus, a smart contract code will be executed
as long as there are peers in the network, i.e. it cannot
be stopped and it is autonomous from its creators.
Also, its rules will be executed as defined by its code,
i.e. its rules are self-enforced [33]. Each interaction
with Ethereum is registered as a cryptographically
signed transaction, similarly to Bitcoin. Examples of
decentralized applications enabled by this technology
include prediction markets [34], social networks [35]
or a game to collect, breed, and sell virtual kitties8 .
This paper proposes the use of smart contracts to 1)
implement a reviewer reputation system and 2) to
enforce the transparency of the peer review rules, for
example, who may assign reviewers, or who can submit
a review (See Section 4).

3.

Requirements

The proposed system aims to provide a distributed
platform for open science, from submission to
publication, including the peer review process
communications. The system rests on three main
pillars: a distributed reviewer reputation system, Open
Access by-design, and transparent governance. These
are outlined in the following subsections.

3.1.

A Distributed Reviewer Reputation
System

The information concerning the quality and
reliability of reviewers is usually private to publishers
and journals (and even editors). There is no easy way
to predict the quality of a reviewer from factors such as
7 http://twister.net.co/
8 https://www.cryptokitties.co/

training and experience [36]. Although this information
is valuable, it is kept private, reinforcing the publishers’
and journals’ influential positions.
This proposal extends traditional peer review
communication workflow with the possibility of
rating peer reviews, building a reputation system for
reviewers [37]. Reviewers are rewarded for worthy, fair,
and timely reviews, or penalized otherwise.
This open reputation network of reviewers
could increase the visibility and recognition of
the reviewers [38]. In fact, such incentives could
even be monetary, using cryptocurrencies [39]. In
addition, creating a public reputation network for
reviewers reduces, or at least exposes, unfair and biased
reviews [2, 40].

3.2.

Open Access By-Design

Open Access focuses on free access to scientific
knowledge. While publishers provide Open Access
content free of charge, their control of the science
dissemination infrastructure allows them to impose
certain rules, such as charging authors unreasonable
fees to offer their work as Open Access (Gold Open
Access) [41] or the temporary embargo and restrictions
on the dissemination of the final version (Green Open
access) [42], among others.
Our system proposes a decentralized infrastructure
for science publications. Academic documents - from
first drafts to final versions, including peer reviews are shared through IPFS, an open P2P network [43]
described in the previous section. In this type of
P2P networks, it is substantially difficult to impose
restrictions on content access and sharing. Thus, the
system inherently (by-design) facilitates Open Access
through its distributed infrastructure, circumventing
publishers’ dominant roles. Moreover, the access to
these documents does not depend on the existence of
our platform. Even if our platform ceases to exist, the
documents could still be retrieved from the network.

3.3.

Transparent Governance

Nowadays, the peer review process is digitally
supported, yet some argue that the system remains
feudal [9]. There are multiple proposals to improve peer
reviews [8], yet communications and processes remain
closed and under the control of journals and publishers,
and thus depend on their specific infrastructures [40].
The proposed system aims to improve the
transparency, speed and fairness of the peer review
process. In order to do this, the system proposes
to support the peer review interactions in an open
and decentralized network. It registers, in a public
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decentralized ledger, the following parts of the
publication process: paper submission, assigning
reviewers, review submission and paper publication.
Thus, processes like the selection of reviewers, or
the contents of the reviews, are open to the public.
With interactions being time-stamped and tamper-proof
thanks to blockchain technology, they can be monitored,
audited, and held accountable. More complex iterations
of the system may consider blind reviews (Section 7.1).
Opening the peer review process communications to
the public could even change the acceptance dynamics
within the system. Currently, high rejection rates are
encouraged because the risk of rejecting a relevant
paper is negligible, while the acceptance of less relevant
content is penalized [9, 44]. However, within a more
transparent system, the first may be penalized as well.
This transparency, combined with a distributed
infrastructure for peer review, facilitates the exploration
of new workflows [40].

4.

Design using a Decentralized
Infrastructure

The system provides a platform for the peer review
process communications, from paper submission to
paper acceptance or rejection, and supports the rating
of peer reviews to build a reviewer reputation network.
The proposed system relies on the technologies
mentioned in section 2. On one hand, the Ethereum
blockchain provides a public decentralized ledger to
record the system’s interactions. Smart contracts are
used to enforce the rules of the system, such as only
accepting reviews of invited reviewers. On the other
hand, IPFS provides a distributed file system to store the
content of the peer review process. This ensures that the
information registered in the platform will be persistent,
free and accessible, and will not rely on a centralized
server.
The sequence diagram of the system (Figure 1)
describes the main interactions of supported peer review
governance. Below we proceed to describe these
interactions and the basic ideas to implement them.

Figure 1. Sequence diagram of platform interaction

Paper submission: The submission process has
three steps within the system. First, the paper is
uploaded to the IPFS network, then the platform will
recover the unique identifier of that paper, the IPFS
address. Finally, the platform will create an Ethereum
smart contract containing the file address and the
addresses of the authors to record the submission on
the blockchain. This creates a transaction in Ethereum
that can be used to verify that the authors submitted the
paper. Furthermore, this smart contract generates an
Ethereum address that acts as a paper’s unique identifier
inside and outside the platform.
Reviewer proposal: A journal editor may invite a
reviewer to review a specific paper, creating a review
task in the paper’s smart contract. The transaction
will record the Ethereum address of the reviewer and,
optionally, a deadline to submit the review. The invited
reviewer may accept or reject the review task (which
will also be recorded into the blockchain). If the task
is rejected, the editor can assign another reviewer.
Submit review To submit a review, the reviewer
should carry out a transaction that will record the
acceptance/rejection and the IPFS address (i.e. the
location) of the detailed review. In the event of a
reviewer sending a review when the time has expired,
a penalty is applied to the reviewer’s reputation in the
reputation system.
Rate review A novelty of the system discussed in
Section 3.1 is the reputation system for reviews. A
blockchain transaction will record the sender address
and the rating as well as the rated review and reviewer
addresses.

5.

Implementation

In order to implement the system, we developed a
proof-of-concept prototype that allowed us to perform
preliminary testing of each interaction within the
platform, exploring the feasibility of its implementation
using the aforementioned decentralized technologies.
Thus, this software implements a basic version of the
requirements specified in Section 3, and follows the
design of Section 4. The software is free/open source,
available in Github9 .
The architecture relies on 1) IPFS for distributed
storage of papers and review reports and 2) Ethereum
Blockchain for the system’s logic and state. The
prototype proposes an HTML + JavaScript interface
that connects to IPFS and Ethereum through JavaScript
clients and uses Metamask10 to provide an user-friendly
management of Ethereum user identities.
9 https://github.com/DecentralizedScience/Gateway
10 https://metamask.io
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Figure 2. Smart contract diagram of the platform

This proof-of-concept prototype uses three different
Ethereum smart contacts to run the platform’s inner
functioning. Figure 2 shows a diagram of this structure.
The Multihash structure is used to store IPFS references
in the system. The Journal contract controls the paper
submission, the selection of editors, the assignment
of reviewers, and the acceptance of reviewers. The
Paper contract identifies a paper within the system,
controls the review submissions, and shares who may
rate a review. Finally, the ReputationStorage contract
stores the ratings of the peer reviews, receive new rates,
updating the reputation of reviewers if allowed by their
Paper contract, and shares the reviewers’ reputation.

6.

Evaluation

A Likert scale survey [45] was conducted to assess
(1) the importance for respondents of the tackled
peer review process problems, (2) to which degree
they believe a reviewer reputation system may help
to improve them and (3) to which extent they would
experience some resistance towards the solution. The
survey constitutes an exploratory study of the validity of
the proposed solution. It addresses academic researchers
interested in the problems of peer review processes. Its
design follows a convenience non-probability sampling:
three different groups of academics that may be
interested in the solution took part in the survey;
namely 1) a Telegram group of 166 members (”Open
Science Ecosystem”) for projects building decentralized
solutions for open science, 2) the Computer Science
department the authors are members of, and 3) a list
of 36 people who have subscribed to a newsletter
available on our prototype website. Thus, the survey
does not aim to generalize the results for the whole
academic researcher population; its purpose is to

explore the response of potentially interested users of
different profiles. That is, would this proposal attract
enough early adopters which would enable further
exploration and validation? The survey is solely targeted
for academic researchers, although the questions are
intended to be answered from the perspective of three
different roles: as authors, reviewers or editors.
The survey first collects data for the characterization
of the population: age, gender, whether the respondent
is (or has been) an academic, and current participation
in research groups or open science projects.
Afterwards, the survey questions the perception
of the importance of the peer review problems, the
possible resistance to a reviewer reputation system, and
the perceived adequacy of such a system to solve the
explored problems. These perceptions are investigated
using a 1 to 5 Likert scale to measure agreement with
the statements, where 1 means ’strongly disagree’ and 5
’strongly agree’.
Problem questions: The survey asked the following
questions related to the problems of the review process:
1) As an author, I think that the quality of the review
process can be sensibly improved. 2) As an author,
I think that the fairness of the review process can be
sensibly improved. 3) The recognition, reputation or
rewards I receive as a reviewer feels fair in relation to
the amount of work that I do. 4) As an editor, I have
difficulties finding good reviewers (quality, relevance,
timeliness).
Resistance responses: Afterwards, the survey
enquires about the following possible resistance for the
adoption of a reviewer reputation system: 5) As an
author, I would prefer to submit my work to a journal
in which reviews can be publicly rated (on a reviewer
reputation system), 6) As a reviewer, I would prefer to
submit a review to a journal in which my review would
be publicly rated (on a reviewer reputation system), 7)
As a reviewer, I would only submit a review to a journal
which rates its reviews, if I remain anonymous. 9) As an
author/editor/reviewer, I would like to be able to rate the
reviews of the papers I am working with.
Problem/solution fit responses: Finally, the survey
asks, for each of the four explored problems, if
the respondents believe that a reputation system of
reviewers may sensibly contribute to address them. 8)
As an editor, I would find a reviewer system sensibly
useful to find relevant, timely and/or high quality
reviewers. 10) I believe that a reviewer reputation
system could sensibly improve the quality and/or
fairness of the peer review process. 11) I believe that
a reviewer reputation system could sensibly improve
the recognition, reputation or rewards I receive for my
reviews.
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Question
#Answers mean* mode
1) quality
35
4.2
4
2) fairness
36
4.4
5
3) rev. fairness**
34
2.4
2
4) finding reviewers
30
3.9
3 or 4
5) author resistance
36
3.9
4
6) reviewer resistance
34
3.6
4
7) anon. rev. resistance
34
3.1
3
8) improve rev. search
30
3.9
4
9) want to rate
36
4.3
5
10) improve qual./fair.
36
4.1
4
11) improve recog.
35
3.9
4
*Max of 5. **Perceived fairness, i.e. lower the better
Table 1. Summary of Likert scale 1 to 5 responses

6.1.

Results

The survey was responded to by 37 people, of which
one was filtered out as a non-researcher. The results of
the survey are summarized below.
33 of the participants are academic researchers,
while 3 have been academic researchers in the past.
8 responded that they do not participate in a research
group or a project related to open science or did not
responded to that question. The age ranges 18-24,
25-34, 35-44 and 45+ are distributed as 1, 11, 14 and
10 participants respectively. 10 are female and 26 male
(none chose other or not responded).
The responses to the 11 likert scale questions with
the 1 to 5 scale are summarized in Table 1.

6.2.

Results discussion

The four explored problems seem to be relevant
for the participants. Note that question 3 is inversed
with respect to the other questions, as it asks for
the perceived fairness of the current process (and not
unfairness). Questions 1 and 2 present the strongest
results, as their means are between agreement and
strong agreement. Questions 3 and 4 have an average
between (dis)agreement and neutral, thus, the perceived
relevance of these problems is relatively smaller than the
former.
The three questions assessing possible resistances
for the adoption of the solution show that both authors
and reviewers would prefer to use the proposed solution.
In fact, only 4 participants disagree in their preference
of the proposed system in each question. With regards
to anonymity, 14 reviewers agree or strongly agree that
anonymity is a needed condition for their participation
in the system, while most respondents remain neutral
or disagree with this need. Participants agree that they
would like to rate reviews (average between agree and

strongly agree).
Finally, the use of a reputation system for reviewers
is perceived as a relevant solution for the explored
problems with averages close to agreement: 3.9 for
finding reviewers, 4.1 for improving quality or fairness
and 3.9 for recognition and reputation of peer reviewers.
Overall, it is considered that this small survey
provides a preliminary evaluation which invites further
exploration of the proposed solution. It is also an
indication that such a system could attract early adopters
with whom to perform further testing.

7.

Privacy requirements

Given the concerns around privacy in the proposed
system, and following the feedback received, we have
explored an extension of this system, taking into
account different privacy settings and their potential
implementations.
In traditional peer review, there are several privacy
settings that can be adopted, allegedly to improve the
fairness of the process [24, 46]: (1) Blind reviews, which
keeps reviewers anonymous, protecting their freedom
to criticize. (2) Double blind reviews, which keeps
both authors and reviewers anonymous, to prevent social
bias. (3) Open reviews, in which both authors and
reviewers are known, with effects under debate [47, 48]

7.1.

Privacy requirements for Reviewer
Reputation Systems

Public
Rater
Anon.
Rater

Public Reviewer
Signed rate
of open review
Anonymous rate
of open review

Anon. Reviewer
Signed rate
of blind review
Anonymous rate
of blind review

Table 2. Different configurations to rate a review

This section builds on the described traditional
privacy settings, adding a new layer of complexity:
we not only deal with reviews, but with both reviews
and ratings. As already proposed in Section 3.1, the
construction of a reputation network of reviewers may
improve the accountability of the peer review process.
Thus, this section explores different privacy settings
such reputation systems may have. One of these
settings, the rating of blind reviews, is explored in more
detail. Challenges of such systems are identified, and
will later guide the discussion in subsection 7.2 on how
this may be achieved.
Signed Rating. Similarly to the open peer review
(explained above), signed ratings are both public and
verified ratings of a review. It is straightforward to
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implement by maintaining a public identity for the
raters.
Anonymous Rating. Protecting the identity of
raters is interesting in several reputation systems [49].
We can support this anonymity feature using blinded
tokens [49] that grant permission to rate without
revealing the identity of the rater. People authorized to
rate a review in the system, e.g. authors, editors and
other reviewers of the paper involved in the process, may
each get one of these tokens.
Rating Blind Reviews. The question of whether we
can keep the benefits of blind reviews while providing
accountability and recognition to reviewers (and thus
rating their reviews) deserves special consideration, and
thus it is explored below.
The following challenges must be considered in
order to provide the Rating Blind Reviews privacy
setting:
Challenge 1 (Anonymity) The reviewer should be able
to claim the rating received in her review (e.g. to receive
a positive reputation) without revealing that she is the
author of the review.
Challenge 2 (Accountability) The reviewer should not
be able to avoid the effect of negative reviews (e.g. only
claiming the positive ratings).
Challenge 3 (Authorization) The ratings should come
from authorized raters (i.e. minimizing cheating).
Challenge 4 (Sybil resistance) Having
several
identities in the system should not provide advantages.
Note that blockchain systems such as Ethereum allow
the creation of multiple identities per user.
Challenge 5 (System abuses) The
anonymity
of
interactions may hinder the detection and prevention of
system abuses. For instance, malicious actors may try to
submit fake reviews to be rated by accounts they control
in order to obtain unfair good ratings. Detecting this
behavior would not be trivial since reviews and ratings
may be anonymous.
A system allowing an anonymous yet accountable
reputation system for peer reviewing would enable a
new privacy and accountability model for peer reviews.
However, its implementation faces important challenges
such as those described above. The next section
provides an overview of how existing techniques may
be applied to tackle the identified challenges.

7.2.

Achieving Accountable Anonymous
Reviews

The previous section identifies challenges that an
anonymous yet accountable reputation system for peer
reviews faces. Some existing technologies have been

applied to similar challenges, and others may help to
combine their advantages. This section explains these
technologies and how they may be used to tackle the
challenges of this system. First it provides an overview
of how the technologies may be combined, and a
description of the technologies follows.
A simple way of protecting the identity of users is the
use of different virtual identities for each interaction, i.e.
single-use identities. However, linking the reputation
received by these single-use identities to their real
identity, both providing accountability (Chlg. 2) and
preserving anonymity (Chlg.1), requires the use of other
technologies.
In order to provide accountability (Chlg. 2), the
system may try to detect when an identity has not
received a bad reputation. For this purpose, a reputation
deposit or collateral could be requested for each rating
a reviewer may receive. This way, users could compare
the number of claimed ratings and the number of
unclaimed ratings, and assume bad ratings for those
that are missing. This collateral-based technique should
be applied carefully, avoiding abuses such as trying to
use the same collateral for different ratings. Advanced
cryptographic techniques such as zk-SNARKs (explained
below) may help to prove that these requirements are
met without compromising a reviewer’s identity. These
techniques may be used to allow a reviewer to claim a
rating from a review she carried out without revealing
her identity but proving her authorship (Chlg. 1).
A different issue is to allow ratings to come solely
from authorized raters (Chlg. 3). To fulfil these
authorization requirements, several techniques such as
blind signatures or blind tokens may be used. These
would enable permission to be granted to a collection
of identities to perform an action, e.g. rate a review,
without revealing which of them voted, or which voted
for what. As previously mentioned, single-use identities
may be used to provide anonymity; in this case, for
raters.
Allowing only authorized rates, as previously
explained, may help to prevent Sybil attacks (Chlg.
4). Moreover, the cost of losing a reputable identity
may reduce the attractiveness of creating a new identity
simply to gain a reputation.
The use of the mentioned zk-SNARKs may also
help to prevent some system abuses. For instance by
enabling the use of cryptographic proofs that verify that
the ratings come from reviews submitted to reputable
journals, would prevent fake reviews and ratings.
Next, the mentioned technologies are explained.
Single-use identities: New single-use identities
may be used as a simple technique to support
anonymous interactions (Chlg. 1). However, supporting
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the authorization rules of the system (Chlg. 3) and
providing accountability (Chlg. 2) for those identities
are challenges that require consideration.
Ring signatures: Ring signatures [50] are a
cryptographic technique that allows the authorization of
a collection of identities to perform an action, while
maintaining the privacy of the specific identity that
performed the action. They may be used to authorize
rates to a group of identities without revealing who
rated what or who rated. Thus, this technique may be
used to support the authorization requirements of the
system (Chlg. 3), while providing some anonymity to
the users (Chlg. 1). Note that with this technique, the
identities of those who may have signed are known, so
the combination with other anonymity measures could
be of interest.
Blind tokens: In the context of an election
and using a cryptographic technique called blind
signatures [51], it is possible to create ballots for
authorized actors that preserve the anonymity of the
vote (both hiding who casted a vote and what each
actor voted) but ensuring that only authorized voters
participated. Note that, as with ring signatures, the
identities of those who may have signed are known,
and thus complementary anonymity measures could be
used. This technique has been also used to anonymize
a distributed reputation system [49]. Thus, it could
be used to provide anonymity to reviewers and raters
(Chlg. 1) while supporting the authorization rules of the
system (Chlg. 3).
Collateral pattern: In order to secure the funds
needed for a blockchain application to function, it is
common that the application requires the participants
to pay for the assets they may lose as collateral. For
instance, a betting smart contract will first ask all
participants to pay their bets and afterwards distribute
the prices. This paper calls this technique ”collateral
pattern”, and proposes its use to provide accountability
(Chlg. 2) to the reviewers of the reputation system
(Section 3.1). For each rating a reviewer may obtain,
the reviewer must spend as much reputation as she may
lose. This encourages the claiming of bad ratings, since
not claiming them may result in a bigger loss.
zk-SNARK: is a cryptographic procedure enabling a
statement to be proved without revealing anything else;
that is, apart from the evaluation if the statement is
in fact true (zero-knowledge proof of knowledge) [52]
. The same authors also provide this property in
a succinct and non-interactive fashion, for example,
using a relatively small proof and not requiring further
communication between prover and verifier. In fact,
the popular Zcash project uses this technology to build
an anonymous cryptocurrency [53]. Proving statements

in this privacy preserving manner is of great interest
for several challenges of the proposed accountable
anonymous review system. For instance, proving that
a user controls a single-use identity may allow the user
to claim the reputation given to that identity (Chlg.
1). Additionally, a reviewer may prove that she paid
the reputation collateral needed to submit a review
without revealing her identity and without being able to
use the same collateral for another review (Chlg. 2).
Finally, proving that the reputation comes from a review
submitted to a collection of honest journals that do not
allow abuses, may help to mitigate the abuses that fake
reviews and ratings represent for the system (Chlg. 5).

8.

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

This paper proposes the opening and
decentralization of three of the peer review
and publication functions: 1) the selection and
recognition of peer reviewers, 2) the distribution of
scientific knowledge, and 3) the peer review process
communication. Arguably, this decentralization of the
infrastructure could help to challenge the central role of
middlemen such as traditional publishers.
Distributed technologies such as blockchain and
IPFS may finally realize the promise of Open Access,
while enabling new models of science dissemination.
Opening and decentralizing the infrastructure enhances
the transparency and accountability of the system, and
may provide a new arena to foster innovation. Note
that the proposed system does not rely on the use of
cryptocurrencies, since it is focused on a not-for-profit
approach, far from the startup-driven commercial
approaches common in the blockchain space.
The transparency provided by opening the peer
review process allows the construction of a reputation
system of reviewers, but also raises concerns about
privacy and fairness. Furthermore, the introduction of
a new public metric (reviewers’ reputation) may also
affect researcher careers, adding pressure to the already
straining processes for academic survival [54]. A
working prototype was developed as a proof-of-concept
of the reviewer reputation system proposal. This work
uses a survey to evaluate the perceived importance of
four peer review process problems and if a reviewer
reputation system is perceived as a solution for them,
as well as the possible resistance to adoption that the
proposal may suffer. The results suggest that the four
problems are relevant, especially peer review quality and
peer review fairness. The studied resistance to adoption
seems low while the participants agree they would like
to use the proposal. Additionally, the participants seem
to agree that the solution addresses the studied problem.
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Still, some challenges of the system remain open as
future work, such as the detection and prevention of fake
science, journals, and conferences or the detection and
prevention of fake reviews, or revenge ratings to game
the reputation system.
Blockchain technologies can be used to replicate
the privacy settings currently used in peer review
processes. However, Blockchain can also be used
to introduce a new review model that supports the
accountability of peer reviewing while maintaining the
anonymity of blind and double blind reviews to improve
fairness. The implications of such accountable, open
and anonymous review models are still to be revealed,
since an incentive based reputation system it could also
support negative dynamic changes such as increasing
competitive dynamics, or gender bias.
Additionally, the proposed system’s infrastructure
relies on new technologies with their own challenges.
Blockchain technologies face scalability issues,
transaction costs, inclusiveness and usability problems
that remain open and under discussion. On the other
hand, distributed file systems such as IPFS may be
more resilient, but they still need somebody in charge
of preserving and providing data, since without that
responsible actor, it may result in an unpredictable loss
of content. Considering these archiving issues, whether
this new technologies will allow the creation of durable
science repositories able to interoperate with legacy,
current and future systems remain open.
Other open issues that require further research and
may be explored in future work are the implementation
of the proposed privacy settings, the exploration
of different copyright regimes, the challenging of
traditional journal-centered metrics to rate publication
quality, different reputation algorithms, different levels
of openness, and the exploration of decentralized
autonomous journals.
Despite the existing challenges, we are confident
that decentralizing the processes that Science relies
on, would open up a whole new playing field, with
implications we cannot possibly foresee. Will its
benefits outweigh its risks?
We believe it is a
conversation worth having.
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